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~ITUATION

III

BOYCOTT
States X and Y are using force against each other but
haYe n1ade no declaration of war. States A, B, and (j
agree severally ·and jointly to boycott both X and Y
until they cease to use force. The boycott has been proclaiined but no detailed instructions have been given to
the navies.
(a) A cruiser of state A, the Ajax, meets a merchant
"essel of state B, the Banner, apparently bound for a
port of X. What should the Ajax do~ Would it make
any difference if the Banner had sailed before the boycott was proclaimed~ "\Vould a cruiser of B, the Brook,
act in the same manner?
(b) A cruiser of state C, the Crown, meets a merchant
vessel of state X bound for state B. What action may
jt take~
(c) The Crown later meets a Inerchant vessel of state
D, the Drone, bound for state X. What action may the
Crown take?
(d) What action may the cruisers of states A, B, and
C take against a vessel of war of state X convoying
merchant vessels of X, or convoying merchant vessels
0f states D, E, and F?
SoLUTION

III

(a) The Ajax should determine for what port the Banner is bound and if for a port of X or if uncertain, should
send the Banner to the nearest port of A, B, or C.
If the Banner had sailed before the boycott was proclaimed, the Banner should be notified of the boycott and
should be prohibited from entering any port of X.
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The Brook should act in the same manner unless for
special reasons the Banner should be ·sent to a port o£ B.
(b) The Crown should take such action as 'vould make
certain that the 1nerchant vessel o£ X goes to a port o£
B or some port o£ A or C.
(c) rrhe Crown, i£ assured o£ the nationality o£ the
Drone, 1nay take no action though the Drone may be kept £ron1 entering ports o£ X 'vhich are effectively closed.
(d) ~1erchant vessels o£ X or D, E and F bound out
£ron1 X under convoy o£ vessel o£ war o£ X are free to
proceed but when bound £or X the cruisers o£ states A,
B, and C may take action to prevent entrance o£ the
vessels to ports which are effectively closed and may
route or take vessels o£ X bound £or X to ports o£ A, B,
and C.
NOTES

Defining war.-W ar is an ancient n1ethod o£ settling
differences. Accounts o£ wars are a1nong the earliest
records o£ human relations. vVars o£ exter1nination were
even approved in some o£ the early sacred books and the
deeds o£ great warriors became the bases for much o£
classic literature in most languages. ~fonuments to warriors appear in many cities and streets, and squares perpetuate their In·einories. Significant o£ a marked change
in attitude is the tribute o£ general recognition given
since 1918 to the "unkno,vn soldier " in contrast with
earlier practice o£ laudation o£ leaders whose names £or
various reasons had become 'vell kno,vn.
With the changing attitude to,vard war, there came at·
tempts to regulate the conduct o£ w.ar and to fix its limits.
The limitation to which the concept o£ war had co1ne
among advanced thinkers toward the end o£ the sixteenth
century is indicated in the definition o£ ·Gentilis ( 1588)
in which he said" war is a properly conducted contest of
armed public forces." (De jure belli, Bk. 1, c. 2.)
Ayala in 1581 had asserted as a £act that there 'vas not
safety "in arms without law and discipline any more
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than in la"r 'vi thout arms " (Westlake, translation, vol.
II, p. V) not endorsing the :formula " in time of war
laws are silent." In succeeding centuries treatises upon
the. la 'vs of war were .common and it was recognized as
an action "to which, ·£rom the nature of the_ thing and
the absence of any common superior tribunal, nations
are compelled to have recourse, in order to assert and
vindicate their rights." (3 Phillimore, International
Law, p. 49.)
'Vi th the gro,vth of states and the increasing burden
of war, rules for its conduct became more and more defined, and the demands of states, not concerned that they
should so far as possible be free of the consequence of
hostilities, further restricted action of belligerents.
'rhe Hague Peace Conference of 1899, called on the
initiative of the Czar of Russia, had in its agenda proposals for limitation of armament and for the regulation
of the conduct of war. The Second Peace Conference at
'The Hague in 1907 elaborated the convention of 1899 in
regard to 'var. The third convention of the Conference
of 1907 " considering that it is important in order to ensure the maintenance of pacific relations, that hostilities
should not commence without previous warning" and
that " a state of war should be notified without delay to
neutral po,vers ", specifically recognized that hostilities
between the signatories must not commen~e " Without
previous and explicit warning ", and that the existence
of a state of war should not take effect as regards neutrals " until after the receipt of notification " unless it is
"clearly established that th~y were in fact aware of the
existence of a state of war."
Definite and explicit notifications were made during
the World War, so1ne of these even specified the day,
hour, and minute at which the state of war would exist.
Provisions 'vere made as to the time when the state of
w·ar sho_u ld be· regarded as at an end. 'rhus it was evident tha~ the previous uncertainty as to the period of
3628-34--7
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host.iliti(~s

'vas no longer a question giving rise to difficulties such as had previously been common. The comlnencenleilt 'vas to be determined by declaration and not,
ns had sometimes been the case, and would be the case
under the definition of Gentilis, by the actual "contest
of the ar1ned public forces", but by the declaration stat·
jng the HlOinent 'vhen such ··contest might be regarded as
]awful and 'vhen a state of 'var would be considered as
t-xisting-. 1"'he i1nplication 'vas that lawful hostilities
he.twtE~en states parties to the convention " should not
cotnmcnce without previous 'varning '' as outlined.
War n tj ght, therefore~ be defined after 1907 as " the
Telation which exists betw·een states or between political
t-ntit.ies when there 1nay la,vfully be what Gentilis in
1588 defined as ' a properly conducted contest of armed
pubhc forces.'" (V\Tilson and Tucker, International
L~nv, 8th ed., p. 235.)
JJeas1t:res short of wrar.-That states should have no
rEffercnees 'vhich could not be settled by diplomatic
negotiation see1ns beyond i1nn1ediate hope of realization.
][n addition to arbitration and judicial methods, for many
years n1cnsures of reprisal, embargo, nonintercourse, display or restricted use of force, and pacific blockade have
been nsecl and ha Ye been regarded as short of war, even
though someti1nes called nonan1icable. Such measures of
force or other pressure 'vere often resorted to, particuJarly fro1n the early days of the nineteenth century.
~Ieas1n·es short of 'var n1ight be used by a neutral to\Yard one or both belligerents when the neutral considered snch 1neasures essential to securing. fair treatnl.ent.
Dlu·j 11g the 'Vorld \V ar by Act of Congress, Septe1nber

8. 1916. the President of the United States 'vas "authorized and empo\vered to 'vithhold clearance " from
vessels of a belligerent country denying American vessels
or citizens " reciprocal liberty of commerce and equal
Ebert.y of trade." (39 U.S.Stat., p. 88, § 806.) An Act
of 1887 had en1 po,vered the President to deny entrance
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to the waters of the United States of Canadian vessels in
case the rights of A1nerican fishermen were denied or
abridged in' Canadian "·aters. ( 24 U.S.Stat., p. 475.}
'fhe Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts of the early
nineteenth century did not produce the anticipated
results.
The granting of " days of grace " for loading and departure of merchant vessels at the outbreak of war was
common in the World War though o'ving to ·different
circumstances was not an invariable practice.
The display of force has also been common as emphasizing the position which a state may be urging or
as giving weight to a request for prompt action in a
matter which one state has brought to the attention of
another state. The display of force may even carry an
intimation that it may be used to ensure respect for the
rights of a state. During the disturbed conditions in
Turkey in 1895 the United States :felt the need of such
support for its minister.
The efforts of the minister have had the moral support of the
presence of naval vessels of the United States on the. Syrian
and Adanan coasts from time to time as occasion required, and
at the present time the San Francisco and Marblehead are about
to be joined by the Minneapolis, which has lately been ordered
to the eastern waters of the 1\Iediterranean. (1895, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 1257.)

Convention on Contract Debts, 1907.-The use of force
in Venezuela to hasten the payment of claims of foreign
nationals in 1902 emphasized the growing objection of
so1ne A1nerican states to this procedure. This objection
had been embodied in the so-called "Drago Doctrine.',.
The 1natter came before the Second Hague Peace Conference, 1907, and resulted in the Convention Respecting the
Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery ?f Contract Debts, which provided :

l

ARTICLE I. The Contracting Pc;>wers agree not to have recourse
to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from
the Government of one country by· the Government of another·
couutry as being due to its nationals.
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This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor
State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or,
after accepting the offer, prevents any "Compromis" from being
agreed on, or, afte-r the arbitration, fails to submit to the award.
(1908, Naval War College, International Law Situations, p. 166.)

'The distinction between the use of force and war was
clearly recognized in the Conference and this agreement
\vas made with the purpose of specifically restricting the
use of force.
Requests for a display of force in China were made
\\·hen the diplomatic representatives feared an outbreak
in 1900 and force was used without resort to war after
the Boxer movement endangered the safety of foreigners.
'The display of force in 1902 by European powers to
l1asten Venezuelan action upon debts due their nationals
"\Yas follo,ved by the use of force . which the European
po\Yers contended 'vas not war but which resolved into
\Yar. In the payment of debts by Venezuela as a result
of this action, preferential treatment was given to the
po,yers which had used force. (Venezuelan Arbitration,
Penfield's Report, 1903, p. 110.) The use of force as
\Yell as the war measures in this case was for the single
purpose of securing payment of the debts and not for a
general 'Yar object.
Oonsequ~ences of pacifio blockade.-Some act resemb1 ing pacific blockade has been generally regarded , as
one of the methods for bringing an offending .state to
ter1ns 'Yithout resort to war. Pacific blockade has the
support of long practice and of a large majority of
~~.nthorities, particularly since the support given to this
ior1n of action in the resolutions of the Institut de Droit
International in 1887. In general, the establishing of a
jpacific blockade is usually approved on the ground that
it 1nay make resort to war less probable, and thus limit
the range of possible use of force.
In its effects as between the state or states establishing the pacific blockade and the state or states under the
blockade, the blockade may close the blockaded areas to
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co1nmunication so far as it is effectively maintained and
measures lawful for 1naintenance of a war blockade n1ay
be taken to this end. As the effects of the pacific blockade should, so far as possible, be confined to the parties
concerned, third parties as well as their vessels and goods
should be interfered with only as necessary for the
physical 1naintenance of the pacific blockade. This is
also evident from the fact that there are no prize courts
to pass upon rights. It may be necessary that the blockading forces approach, 'vithin the specific area of effective maintenance of the blockade, vessels of third states
for the purpose of verification of their right to fly the
flag. l'he blockading force may take such n1easures as
are necessary for closing the port before which it is
Inaintaining an effective blockade. Though it n1ay not
take vessels of third states as prize, it may prevent their
entrance; and for such detention the blockading state assumes no liability, though notice must be given the vessel
of the third state at the line of blockade or in an unquestionable 1nanner.
essels of third states must also be
granted reasonable time to load and depart from a port
under pacific blockade.
Block(J)de of Buenos Ayres, 1838.-The declarations by
'v hich some of the blockades of the nineteenth century
'vere established were not unifmm. On March 28, 1838,
a circular containing the following paragraph referring
to the blockade of the port of Buenos Ayres a-nd the
Argentine coast 'vas transmitted to the foreign diplomatic and consular representatives. by the French
Government :

'T

Je vous prie done, ~Ionsieur, d'informer Yotre Govenunent de
cette mesure, et de faire connaitre en n1eme te1ns qu'il sera pris
contre les btitin1ens qui chercherainet a entrer dans les Ports
bloques, apres avoir recu la signification du blocus par run des
btitimens de guerre Francais, les mesures de rigueur autorisees
par les Lois des Nations. (26 [1837-38] British and Foreign
State Papers, p. 973.)

Days of .grace for ei1trance and departure till ~fay 10
were granted.

96

BOYCOTT

Le Oomte de Thomar, 1848.-The Brazilian vessel Le
Oomte de Thomar had been before a prize commission
established at Montevideo at the time of the so-called
blockade of the la Plata. The vessel had been released,
but war material in its cargo had been condemned by this
prize commission, August 6, 1846. The case was subsequently brought before the French Conseil d'Etat, which
reviewed the case and declared :
Considerant que, par Ia decision ci-dessus visee, Ia commission
des prises, en ordonnant Ia restitution du navire le Oomte de
Thomar et des marchandises trouvees A bord, a n~anmoins declar~
valide Ia prise de 686 barils de poudre et de 50 quintaux de plomb
en barre;
Considerant que, si les regles et Ia pratique constante du droit
maritime autorisent Ia saisie sur un navire neutre des objets de
cette nature, qualifies de contrebade de guerre, c'est dans le cas
seulement ou le batiment capteur appartient a une puissance
belligeran te ;
Considerant que, qu'il resulte de Ia lettre du ministre des affaires etrangeres que, nonobstant le blocus des cotes de Ia republique argentine, le gouvernement fran~ais n'etait pas en etat de
guerre avec ladite republique.
ART. ler. Est declaree non valide Ia prise des barils de poudre
et des plombs en barre trouves a bord du navire bresilien le
Gomte de Thomar. (I Pistoye & Duverdy, p. 390.)

This decision is followed by this brief comment:
.

"

Observations.-Nous comprenons qu'un Etat qui bloque un port,
sans1.faire la grande guerre, permette le·· transport des armes et

munitions pour le port bloque. L'arret ci-dessus nous parait un
acte de munificence et de liberalite, bien plus qu'un acte juridique.
(Ibid.)

Cartagena, 1885.-At the time of domestic disturbance
in Colombia in 1885 when other states were at peace, Mr.
Bayard, Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Whitney, Secretary of the Navy, of protection of nationals and their
property. He said:
At Cartagena, as at any other point in Colombia, not on the
direct line of isthmian transit, the only question presented for
our consideration is the general one of the protection of the
liYes and property of citizens of the United States established
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there. Our right in this respect is of course neither more nor
less than that of any other government whose citizens or subjects
may be found at such points under similar circumstances. Interests of other nationalities than our own are understood to exist
at Cartagena. Consequently no measure could be taken by forces
of the United States for the protection of their citizens there1
'~hich we would not admit the perfect right of another government-that of England, France, or Germany, for instance-to employ for the like protection of its subjects. * * * But where
the place of their sojourn is a port open to the world's commerce~
to which foreign vessels have a right to resort, the presence of
war vessels of their nation is proper to protect the national
shipping in port and the lives and property of neutral citizens
on shore, from any injurious treatment contrary to the received
interna tiona! rules of warfare. Such war vessels may properly
afford asylum to our own noncombatant citizens and normnl pro·tection to their interests within tbe limits of legitimate waiCfare~
and extreme cases may be conceived where the supreme law or
self-preservation may require more effective measures if the
bounds of legitimate warfare be overpassed. In no event, however, should such measures amount to an intervention in the
df•mestic distgrbances of that country by aiding one belligerent
against the other. (6 Moore, International Law Digest, P~ 29.)

Greece, 1897.-The so-called pacific blockade of Greece
in 1897 is one in regard to which the United States took
a positive position.
On February 10 the British Government sent to its
representatives in ··Austria-Hungary, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, the following telegraphic dispatch:
The French Ambassador has suggested to me, and I ha V<~
ugreed, that instructions should be sent to our Naval Commanders
in Cretan waters to concert, in case of need, with . the Naval
Commanders of the other Great Powers for preventing the· Greek
ships of war from taking any aggressive action, and for ta!png
such measures as seem to be required by the circumstances which
may arise. (90 British and Foreign States Papers, 1897-1898r
p. 1299.)

-;.On the next day the British Admiralty telegraphed to
its naval commander in Greek waters that
It has been suggested_ by the French Government that thr3
British and French Naval Comm~nders in Cretan waters should
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concert together, and with those of other Powers in case of
necessity, to prevent any aggressive action of the Greek ships of
war sent to Crete, and, generally speaking, for the adoption of
any measures which circumstances may render expedient. The
concurrence of Her Majesty's Government has been given. Instruct the Senior Naval Officer at Crete accordingly. (Ibid.,
p. 1300.)

The German authorities favoring action by the Powers,
mentioned that
Not only should aggressiYe action on the part of the Greek
ships be prevented, but any action which might encourage the
revolution, and the very fact of their presence in Cretan waters
was calculated to encourage it. In His Excellency's opinion,
therefore, it 'vould be necessary to give considerable latitude to
the Naval Commanders as to the manner in which they should
deal with the Greek ships of war, and to authorize them, if they
sh9uld d·e em it necessary, to drive the1n away from Cretan waters.
(Ibid., p. 1313.)

On February ~6, 1897, the British Govern1nent sent to
its admiral in Cretan waters instructions to the following
effect:
You have authority to take any steps in conjunction with the
other Naval Commanders, 'vhich may be agreed upon by the Admirals in Council, for the purpose of preventing aggressive action
on the part of the Greeks. (Ibid., p. 1316.)
'

In accord with these instructions certain acts had been
approved as was stated in a Foreign Office communica-:
tion of February 18, 1897:
The Russian Ambassador stated to-day that, at the request of
the Ottoman Government, Admiral ·Andreeff, the Russian Naval
Commander in Cretan waters, had been authorized .t9 prevent
Greek ships of war from interfering with the transport of TUrkish troops between various points of the Cretan coast, and also to
occupy by common accord certain other places on the coast, especially Candia, Rethymo, Sitia, Kissamo, and Selino.
The instructions given to the British Admiral will enable him to
take part in any measures of this nature which the Naval Commanders of the other Powers may agree. (91 British and Foreign
State Papers, 1898-1899, p. 132.)

· About this time a. joint blockade of Greek ports was
proposed, but the Great Powers were faced with the prob-
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letn of detern1ining the status of Crete to which they
had sent forces and some of the powers 'vere in favor of
the continuance of the status quo.
The British Embassy in Berlin reported that the
GernUtn Emperor frowned upon the annexation of Crete
by Greece. As "the Great Po,vers had prevented the
Sultan from sending troops to Crete ", they were under
'" 1noral obligation of preventing the Greeks fro1n annexing the island. * * * If the Great Powers allowed
the1nsel ves to be defied by Greece, not only would they
n1ake themselves ridiculous but they 'vould make themselves responsible for the consequences, which would
probably be a general war. For his part, His Majesty
could not agree to sanction such lamentable weakness on
the part of the Powers, and he would withdraw his flag
from the Mediterranean. I ventured to observe that this
would bring the European concert to an end, to which
His Majesty replied that it did not deserve to exist if it
allo,ved its decisions to be overruled by Greece." (Ibid,
p. 137). l\fany notes 'vere exchanged among the Great
Powers and the plan was advanced to make Crete a
privileged province 'vith special relations to Greece although it 1night remain a part of the 1'urkish Empire.
The British Government informed the cooperating
po\Yers on February 24, 1897, of the policy which they
considered as according to their view:
1. That the establishment of adn1inistrative autonomy in Crete
is, in their judgtnent, a neces·s ary condition to the termination of
the international occupation.
2. That, subject to the above provision, Crete ought, in their
judgment, to remain a portion of the Turkish Empire.
3. That Turkey and Greece ought to be informed by the Powers
of this resolution.
4. That if either Turkey or Greece persistently refuse ,vhen
required to withdraw their naval and military forces from the
island, the Powers should impose their decision by force upon the
State so refusing. (Ibid., p. 147.)

Objection was raised to point 4 on the ground that
.9~.~-~f.e a~d ';rurkey should not be subject to identic treat-
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m<~nt

as Turkish forces were lawfully in Crete while
Greek forces were not~ On March 20, 1897, the following
p:rocJ amation signed by the ambassadors of the six
powers 'vas issued to the United States.
j[ be

Undersigned, under instructions from their respective
Governments, have the honor to notify the Government of the
Uniite<l States that the admirals in command of the torces of
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and
R.ussia in Cretan waters have decided to put the Island of Crete
h.] a state of blockade, commencing the 21st instant at 8 a.m.
The blockade will be general for all ships under the Greek flag.
Ships of the six powers or neutral powers may enter into the
:ports occupied by the powers and land their merchandise, but
only if it is not for the Greek troops or the interior of the island.
~he ships may be visited by the ships of the international fleets.
The li mits of the blockade are comprised between 23°24' and
26°30' longitude east of Greenwich, and 35°48' and 34°45' north
Jatitude. (1897, Foreign Relations U.S., p. 254.)
1

Joint blockade, 1913.-The officers in command of the
British, Austro-Hungarian, French, German, and Italian
naval forces notified a blockade as in force from 8 a.m.
April 10, 1913, of the Adriatic coast from Antivari to
the n1outh of the River Dvin. This blockade was extended to Durazzo from 6 a.m., April 23 and was raised
~rrom 2 p.m., May 14, 1913.
In reply to a question in the House of Commons, April
7~ 1913, Sir Edward Grey had said that certain British
vessels 1vere proceeding to the coast of Montenegro to
ta.ke part in a naval demonstration " 'vith the .above
10amed states." He offered the following explanation:
We are party to it because we are a party with the other

Great Powers to an agreement which the naval demonstration is
]ntended t o uphold. This agreement is that there should be
an autonomous Albania. We willingly became a party to this, for
the Albanians are separate in race, in language, and to a great
-extent in religion. The war which is proceeding against them has
long ceased to haYe any bearing on the war between Turkey and
the Allies, or to be a war of liberation. The operations of Montenegro against Scutari are part of a war of conquest, and there
:is no reason why the sa1ne sympathy that \Vas felt for l\fontenegro
or Ctther coun t ries contending for liberty and national existence
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should not be extended to the Albanian population of Scutari and
its district, who are mainly Catholics and l\1oslem, and who are
contending for their lands, their religion;· their language, and
their lives. (LI Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1913, p. 816.)

Sir Edward Grey further 1naintained that the agree1nent
'vas essential to the peace of Europe and should be upheld
by international action.
Blockade of Greece, 1916.-The blockade of Greece by
the Allies in 1916, declared to be in effect from Decemoer
8, 8 a.m., allo,ved a period of 48 hours for the departure
of "vessels of third po,vers " from Greek harbors. Prot€st against this blockade 'vas made by Greek officials as
co~trary to international law on the ground that peaceful
relations existed bet,veen Greece and the Allies.
Italian blockade of Fiume, 1920.-1'he French "Journal officiel de la Republique Francaise " of December 4,
1920, contained the follo\\"ing notification:
A la date du 1 cr decembre 1920, le Gouvernement italien a infornle le Gouverne1nent de la Republique de sa decision de tenir
en etat de blocus effectif par ses forces navales, a partir du 1"
decembre a 10 heures, la zone cotiere de l'Etat independant de
Fiume, des iles de Veglia et Arbe et des parages avoisinants.
Un delai opportun sera laisse pour la sortie des na vires de commerce amis.

This notification does not refer to neutrals but to " amis."
The blockade of Bulgaria, October 16, 1915, referred
to " friendly or neutral vessels " as being granted days of
grace.
Reprisals.-Early ideas on the doctrine of reprisals, of
which boycott may be regarded as a phase, appear among
writers. Theologians of medieval times found little
difficulty in supporting reprisals by Biblical injunctions.
A clear distinction between reprisals in war and reprisals
in peace 'vas not always made.
The treatise of Bartolus (1313-59) was quite full upon
t.his. ·
'Tictoria (1480-1546) and others of this period 'vrite
upon the subject. Grotius refers to the reprisals more
in relation to war. The words " retorsion ", " reprisal ",
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"embargo"," nonintercourse" and the like, were not al'vays used in senses that could be clearly distinguished.
Retorsion was usually applied to retaliation· in kind,
'vhile reprisals aimed to secure redress :for action by
'vhich a state regarded itself to be injured and the n1eans
n1ight not be analogous to the injury, but such as the
offended state might regard as most effective. Two comlnercial states might set up by retorsion reciprocal trade
barriers, while by reprisal one state n1ight bring another
to recognize privileges through holding its king who
1night chance to be within its borders. In ancient tin1es
the limits of reprisals were difficult to determine, though
there was a growing sense that they should be proportioned to the injury for which remedy was sought.
Opinions of writers.-Writers upon the topic of pacific
blockade have shown wide difference of opinion as to
'vhether it was a }a,vful measure short of war in spite o:f
the title "pacific." Some have considered it merely a
lj1nited hostility but lawful; others have regarded it as
unla,vful; so1ne have regarded it as la"rful only as regards the blockading and blockaded parties; 'vhile still
others have regarded it as lawful as regards all states and
short of war. Practice seems to support the opinion that
pacific blockade is a. lawful measure of constraint short
of 'var, but operating directly only upon the blockaded
and blockading states. In several recent pacific blockades, however, third states have not protested against
the application of its provisions deter1nining the nun1ber of days of grace allowed to their merchant vessels
to ·withdraw from the blockaded area.
The measures undertaken under the name" pacific blockade "seem to be recognized generally as lawful when confined to the states concerned. These measures seem to
be adequately effective only when extended also to third
states which would at least create a state of quasi war
and quasi neutrality. There arises, therefore, the old
question of effectivity of blockade but transferred to
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pacific blockaue. Under modern conditions of com1nerce
to be really effective a blockade must be against ships
1:nder all flags and this degree of constraint is not generally reeognized .as an ·attribute of pacific blockade.
Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant i1nplies
measures .of collective coercion that go beyond pacific
block9-de in their inclusive nature but, in the application
of force by individual states for effective use of collectiYe
force " to protect the covenants of the r~eague "' may be
more restricted.
lnstitut de Droit /11.ternational, 1887.-A report was
1nade to the Institut de Droit International at the meeting in Heidelberg in 1887 upon the right of blockade
in time of peace. Dr. Perels, "' ho was the adviser of
the German ad1niralty, made the report. This report
admits that the pacific blockade is comparatively 1nodern
but that this does not deny its legality, as develop1nent
of ne'v relations a1nong states in1plies new n1ethods.
Discu~sion, 1902.-This Naval War College considered
certain aspects of pacific blockade in 1902 showing that
while early practice before the middle of the nineteenth
century had extended the operation of the blockade to
third powers, later practice had tended to limit the
effects of pacific blockade to the parties directly concerned. In the r·esume of the discussion in 1902, it was
said:
It would seem from the weight of authorities and from the
majority of later cases, that pacific blockades should not bear
upon third states except as they are affected by the constraint
directly applied to the state blockaded, i.e., the vessels of a third
state should be entirely free to go and come while such measures
of constraint as may be decided upon 1nay be applied to the
blockaded state.
If the need for interruption of relations between the blockaded state and third states is sufficiently serious to require the
seizure of neutral vessels, it would seem to warrant the institution of a regular blockade involving a state of war.
If only the mild constraint which is short of war, the blockade affecting merely the blockaded state's commerce, is necessary,
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then pacific blockade, though it works inconvenience, may be legitilnatc. (1902, Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations,
p. 87.)

It was further said in the conclusions that it was now
( 1902) the general opinion :
( 1) That pacific blockade should be exclusively confined to
those who are parties to it and should not be extended to third
states.
( 2) That pacific blockade as a measure short of war does not
involve any neutrality on the part of those not parties to it.
( 3) That pacific blockade should be limited as far as possible
that it may not be confused with belligerent blockade, which is
definitely outlined. (Ibid., p. 97.)

A1nerican Institute of International Law1, 1925.-In
1925 the A1nerican Institute of International La,v presented a plan for measures of repression enu1nerating
~ - 1neasures of self-redress short of war." In the list
are included nonintercourse and pacific blockade.
\Vhile pacific blockade is regarded in this project as a
t~se of force, it is not regarded as giving rise to a state
of ·war though when applied to vessels of third states
-:.t is considered "in effect an act of war."
ARTICLE

10.

PAC'IFIC BLOCKADE.

Pacific blockade consists in the obstructing or closing of the
ports or coasts of one country by another. Its purpose is to
prevent access to or egress from a foreign port or coast---compelllng the territorial sovereign to yield to the demands which have
been made upon the blockaded state. If confined solely to the
oeountry against which the measure is taken, the act is said to be
pacific, and it does not necessarily create a state of war. If the
blockade affects the vessels of other nations, it is in effect an
:act of war. (20 American Journal, International Law, Sup.,
:i1925, project no. 29, p. 383.)

Pacific blockade and Article 16.-In a report of May
17, 1927, of the Secretary General of the League of N ations upon the legal position which would arise in enforcing article 16 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations in time of peace, it was said:

I.JEAGUE ATTITUDE
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The question how far the sanctions can lawfully · be carried
without resort to war is considered below with reference to each
of the above classes of State. It may be noted here thaf, from
the legal point of view, the existence of a state of war bet,--veeu
two States depends upon their intention and not upon the nature
of their acts. Accordingly, measures of coercion, however drastic~
which are not intended to create and are not regarded by thii:!
State to w~lch they are applied as creating a state of \var, do
not legnlly establish a relation of war between the states concerned. This would seem to be the case even if, as is ·suggested
to be possible under point (c) below, third States find it necess:u."y
to guide their own conduct by the view that a state of war
exists. There is no general rule of international law under
which application of the economic sanctions would automa ticaUy
p1·oduce a state of war. (Reports and Resolutions, League of
Nations Documents, A. 14. 19'27. V., p. 83.)
I...~ater

it is said :

It is therefore prudent to conclude that, in applying the e·conomic sanctions of Article 16 without resort to war, the Member~~
of the League must fully respect the rights of third Stat(~s.
(Ibid., p. 86.)

The hope was expressed, ho,vever, that third sta1tes
·would adopt a " benevolent attitude " to,vard the Leagflh?J
policy.
It was also said in this report that:
It would not in fact be prudent to attempt to lay down posi·
tively in advance the measures which the Members of the Leagw~·
could consider themselves as legally entitled to adopt toward
third States under the form of a pacific blockade. Not nwrely
is the existing law uncertain but it is uncertain how f ar thi.rd.
States would or would not be disposed to take a narrow view of
the application of the existing law to the special and unprec~
dented case of a pacific blockade applied under Article 16 of tbe
Covenant. The tendency before the war of 1914-18 was t~Jo
recognize that a pacific blockade imposed in the interests of international order by a number of Powers had a much higher clain.t
to be regarded as an institution of international law than a blockade enforcing the particular interests of certain Powers, a.ud ·a
blockade under Article 16 is in the fullest sense one falling within
the first category.
It appears to be a legitimate conclusion from the practice and
doctrine of international law before the war of 1914-18 that a.
pacific blockade imposed in application of Article 16 of the Cov~-
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nant and observing certain conditions and limits \vould be a measure the legal validity of which should be recognized by third
States. To secure such recognition from third States, it would
seem that the blockade ought to comply with the conditions as
to notification and effectiveness which apply to a blockade in time
of war. The blockade \vould give the right not to confiscate but
to sequestrate ships of the blockaded State ~"'at~empting to breakthrough it and their cargoes, the ships and cargoes being ultimately returned without compensation to their owners. It would
seem, further, that third States would not legally be entitled to
object to the enforcement of the blockade, with the suggested
consequences, against ships of 1\Iembers of the League, whether
applying the sanctions or not, and their cargoes.
On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether the third State
would be legally bound to acquie&::e in the enforcement of the
blockade against its own ships and their cargoes. (Ibid., p. 88.)

Object of measu1"es short of w-ar and boycott.-The
object of Ineasures short of war is usually to settle some
difference in which the parties are directly concerned.
This is the case in retorsion, reprisals, and retaliation in
various for1ns. Nonintercourse and embargo decrees
usually contain some sta.te1nent of injuries for which
remedy is sought by the state establishing the regulation.
Pacific blockade as a measure short of war has at times
been used as a means of remedy for a condition in which
the parties proclaiming the blockade are only indirectly
concerned.
International boycott has been advocated as a means of
putting pressure upon a state which n1ay be considered
to have failed to fulfill some international obligation
which may only remotely con.cern the states engaging in
the boycott. The boycott is especially aimed to put an
end to commercial relations with the boycotted state.
When such boycott is solely a.n act of individuals who
without any participation or action of the state refrain
from commercial relations with the nationals of another
state, the boycott as such has no bearing upon international law. A modern state would scarcely expect, without laying itself open to reprisals, to determine with

INTERNATIONAL BOYCOTT

whom or in what its nationals should trade other than bygeneral tariff laws and treaties.
If members of the League of Nations under article 1()..
prevent " all financial, com1nercial, or personal intercourse bet,veen the nationals of the covenant-breaking·
state and the nationals of any other state, 'vhether a mem-ber of the League or not", then such an act by whatever ·
name it is called, ceases to be a private and becomes a
public act with international consequences. If the socalled " covenant-breaking state " is a land-locked state,.
the action of the other states 'vould partake of the nature
of a boycott 'vhich the participating states would be under obligations to enforce by appropriate measures. If.
the covenant-breaking state has a seacoast, the enforce- ment of the prevention called for would partake of the ·
nature of 'vhat in earlier days has been called a pacific ·
blockade, a 1neasure 'vhich has often been used by statesto bring another state to fulfill its obligations or to take ·
certain action.
While boycott \vas in its early develop1nent an in-dividual and unofficial action, as in China in the early
part of the nineteenth century, it gradually took on a po- ·
litical nature and 'vhen it became collective and more or ·
less official, protests w·ere made. The dangers of unauthorized, individual, or collective action by groups of·
individuals in retaliation against action of a foreign state
was recognized. Such action might be based upon incorrect or partial understanding of the circumstances and
might involve the state 'vhose nationals engaged in the ·
boycott in serious consequences, making the settlement of ·
a question 1nore difficult. At the same time, boycott was .
recognized as a. n1easure which might be very potent if
properly used but unless the state acted directly or indirectly, the state could not be held responsible for ·
determining whether its nationals discriminated against
the goods or commerce of a specific state. An unofficial'
boycott by nationals has extended in some instances not
3628-34-8
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me_rely to goods and commerce but also to persons, language, journals, music, etc., of the state against which
,pr~ssure was aimed. Article 16 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations endorsed the prevention of all intercourse between the nationals of a covenant-breaking state
and the nationals of other states, and provided for mutual support, even presuming the use of force, and affording passage through their territory to forces coop·erating to protect the covenants of the League. For
maritime states somewhat similar measures had been
undertaken for a century in what had come to be known
as pacific blockade 'vhich aimed at a partial isolation of
.a state while article 16 aimed at complete isolation.
Some have maintained that article 16 conte1nplates <11
resort to war on the part of the covenant-breaking state
against which the other n1embe~s of the League undertake only such measures as will isolate the offender.
Others have maintained that an act of war having taken
place, a state of war exists, and the consequences are
limited only by the laws of 'var and neutrality. Paragraph 2, of article 16, seems to give the council authority
to recommend such use of armed forces as may be needed
to protect the covenants of the League 'vithout necessarily creating a state of war in the technical sense but
authorizing the use of force to protect the covenant.
The provisions of article 16 would not be necessarily
.applicable to a state of war but to a condition of isolation consequent upon a disregard of its covenants. Of
course this article 16 was drawn with the expectation
that all the more powerful states 'vould be members of
the League under which conditions its application would
be more simple.
Chinese boyaott, 1905.-"fhe termination of the treaty
of 1894 between the United States and China after its
10-year period in 1904, made it desirable to negotiate a
new treaty. Rumors spread in China that its terms were
to be detrimental to China and it was urged that the
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people should sho"\v their opposition by b_oycotting after
August 1, 1904, "all American schools, business, goods,
products, and ships unless the ~exclusion treaty guaranteed· equitable treatment to travelers, students, and merchants entering the United States." Minister Rockhill,
long fainiliar 'vith oriental diplonlacy, found much to
confirm his opinion that the boycott was " "\Vith official
Hpproval i£ not actually at official suggestion." The
governmental encouragement seems evident from notices
and proclamations.
The Chinese Government was notified in early August,
1905, that under early treaties the United States would
1~.old China " responsible for any loss sustained by the
.A.merican trade on account of any failure on the part
of China to stop the present organized movement against
the United States." (1905 Foreign Relations, U.S., p.
212.) Later the Chinese Government informed Minister
Rockhill that the Government assumed no responsibility
a~ the 1novement 'vas started by the traders.
Boycott of Danzig.-Owing to differences of various
kinds with the Polish Government accusations were
made that Danzig had suffered by measures taken in
Poland against the Free City. A report by the Government of the Free City of Danzig, August 14, 1931, says:
A particularly serious difficulty in the relations between Danzig
and Poland is due to the economic injury suffered by the Free
City as the result of measures taken by the Polish Government.
Unfortunately no alleviation or improvement has been perceptible in this respect since the session of the Council in May. An
impression has, on the contrary, been created in the Danzig
population that the Polish Government, by its economic measures against Danzig, has been deliberately aiming at injuring the
trade and industry of Danzig and at the same time at weakening,
in this way, the resistance of the Danzig population to Polish
political aims. It is inco~prehensible, otherwise, that the Polish
Government, which, in view of the Customs and economic union,
has it in its power to grant Danzig all kinds of economic facilities, should bluntly reject all suggestions of the Danzig Government to this effect, and shoul.d on the contrary keep contriving
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new measures which are bound seriously to injure Danzig's trade
and industry. The repeated attempts of Danzig-more particularly through the commercial senator-to bring about an exchange of views on all questions still pending have proved
abortive. Poland has made no use of this ()pportunity, but -._bas,
without -any real grounds, .postponed negotiations indefinitely,
especially on the subject of the exceptional importation of
specific goods, of so-called quotas, which are indispensable for the economic life of Danzig. The Danzig Chamber
of Commerce has exerted itself in the same direction as the Danzig· Government. As evidence may be mentioned the fact that it
not long ago issued a warning in a public proclamation not to
reply to the extensive boycotting of Danzig goods in Polish circles by a counter boycott of Polish goods in Danzig. Economic
co-operation, as provided for in the treaties, is a preliminary condition for regular political relations between Danzig and Poland.
The unjust exclusion of Danzig trade from the Polish hinterland,
the confiscation of Danzig goods in Poland-contrary to the spirit
of the treaties--the steady increase in the boycotting movement,
are bound to create in the particular circles affected in Danzig
a state of discontent which lnay have most serious consequences.
If normal relations are to be established between the two States,
dependent upon one another as the result of the treaties, it is
essential first and foren1ost to eliminate the economic pressure
still brought to bear by Poland on Danzig. (Access to, or anchorage in, the port of Danzig of Polish war vessels. Permanent
Court of International Justice, Series 0, No. 55, p. 36.)

Committee on Boycotts and Peace, 1932.-In 1931 the
Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund entrusted to
a committee the drawing up of a report on Economic
Sanctions for the Pact of Paris. In the report of this
committee, March 2, 1932, the following was mentioned
as the crucial question to 'vhich the committee was giving
attention.
What shall be the attitude and the policy of the other powers
signatory to the Pact of Paris, if one or more of their number,
failing to conform to the pledge given in the Pact, do begin or
threaten hostilities?
The Con1mittee on Econmnic Sanctions is of opinion that the
time has now fully come for the powers signatory to the Pact of
Paris to declare, in answer to this question, what, under such
circumstances, will be their policy.
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In the present state of world opinion, it is highly probable that
no people whose government is signatory to the Pact of Paris
will desire the use of their government's military and naval force's
in the settlement of international quarrels arising elsewhere in
the world. Nevertheless, a clear and definite violation of the
pledges given in the Pact of Paris may easily lead to another
world-wide armed conflict, this time finally and fatally disastrous
in its effects.
The Committee accordingly suggest that the signatories of the
Pact of Paris should enter into au appropriat(\ protocol or agreenlent supplemental to that Pact whereby they will engage themselves, in the event of hostilitie·s, actual or threatened, promptly
to consult together with a view to determine upon measures of
nonintercourse which would be appropriate to prevent the threatened breach of the Pact, or if it could not be prevented, to end
hostilities and to restore the status existing prior to the breach.
A1nong the measures of nonintercourse which could be applied
would be:
(1) A cessation of any shipment of arms or munition·s or other
absolute contraband;
(2) Such further economic sanctions and concerted measures,
short of the use of force, as may be determined to be appropriate
and practical under the circum·stances of any given case. (Boycotts and Peace, E. Clark, editor, p. 7.)

The nonintercours(l measures proposed are those short
uf the use of force. There are many grounds :for believing that the states o:f the world do not yet regard such
measures as sufficing :for their security.
lJ! easures of constraint.-Even before the vV or ld War
there "\vas a gro,ving interest in the . settle1nent of differences bet,Yeen states ''ithout resort to 'var. In early
tiines there 'vas resort to n1easures of restraint upon con1lnercial intercourse bet,veen states in order to bring one
state to accept the terms proposed by another or in order
to check certain actions.
It 'vas maintained that a state might control its own
territories and determine at will what passed its :frontiers. It was sometime stated that tariff acts 'vere an
evidence of the right of a state to control commerce.
The reply to this "\Vas that tariff acts 'vere of general application while these other 1neasures 'vere aimed at a
sjngle state.
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Whenever nationals of one state of their O\Vn volition
assuine an attitude \Vhich limits or puts an end to their
relations with the nationals of another state, this attitude was regarded before 1914 as beyond state control
and as an act for which a state could disclaim all responsibility even though injury to the commerce or other
injury n1ight be suffered. If a state encouraged or officially participated in this attitude, then there might be
ground for international complaint on the part of a
friendly state.
Peace conferences as at Berne, 1892; Budapest, 1896;
Paris, 1900; l\1ilan, 1906; and Geneva, 1912, had proposed measures for making effective the awards of international tribunals. Among the measures suggested
\vhich received particular support was the prohibition
of econo1nic relations with a recalcitrant state. Some
peace conferences arrived at the conclusion that mere
agitation for the spread of good will would not attain the
hoped-for peace a1nong states, and that states should be
1nade to realize that peace was essential to national
progress and preferable to war. To this end these conferences proposed measures which would result in economic isolation of states not fulfilling their international
obligations.
The Tampico incident, 1914.-In 1914 while there was
a disturbed condition of affairs in Mexico, an event at
~Tampico gave rise to various complications. The event
jg thus set forth by the American Admiral Mayo in a
communication to the Mexican co1nmanding officer of the
liuertista forces. resisting the constitutionalists ashore:
This morning an officer and squad of men of the Mexican military forces arrested and marched through the street of Tampico
a commissioned officer of the United States Navy, the paymaster
of the U.S.S. Dolphin, together with seven men composing the
crew of the whaleboat of the Dolphin.
At the time of this arrest the officer and 1nen concerned 'vere
unarmed and engaged in loading cases of gasoline which had been
vurchased o~ shore. Part of these men were on the shore, but
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all, including the man or men in the boat, were forced to accompany the armed Mexican force.
I do not need to tell you that taldng men from a boa.t flying
the American flag· is a hostile act not to be excused.
I have already received your verbal message of regret that this:
eYent had happened, and your statement that it was committed
by an ignorant officer.
The responsibility for hostile acts cannot be avoided by theplea of ignorance.
In view of the publicity of this occurrence, I must requirethat you send 1ne, by suitable members of your staff, formal disavowal of and apology for the act, together with your assurance
that the officer responsible for it will receive severe punishment.
Also that you publicly hoist the American flag in a prominent
position on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns, which salute
will be duly returned by this ship.
Your answer to this communication, should reach me and thecalled-for salute be fired within twenty-four hours from 6 p.m.
of this date.
MAYO.

(1914, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 448.)

An apology 'vas offered but the salute to the flag was
not rendered and at length President Wilson on April
20, addressed Congress. Setting forth the grave situation in Mexico, he said :
I, therefore, come to ask your approval that I should use thearmed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an
extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and
his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of
the United States, even amidst the distressing conditions now
unhappily obtaining in Mexico.
There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or ofselfish aggrandizement .. 'Ve seek to maintain the dignity and
authority of the United States only because we wish always to·
keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both
in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for
the benefit of mankind. (Ibid., p. 476.)

The address resulted in the following action :
In view of the facts presented by the President of the United
States in his address delivered to the Congress in joint session on
the twentieth day of April, nineteen hundred and fourteen, with
regard to certain affronts and indignities committed against theUnited States in Mexico: Be it
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Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assentbled, That the Presi-

·dent is justified in the employ1nent of the ar1ned forces of the
United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal :unentls for
certain affronts and indignities committed against the United
States.
Be it further resozv,ed, That the United States disclaims any
hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon
_Mexico.
Approved, April 22, 1914. (38 U.S. Statutes, p. 770.)

In communicating this action to American diplomatic
representatives abroad on April 23, 1914, Secretary
Bryan said:
Please note that the word "justified" is used instead of " authorized." This was done to emphasize the fact that the resolution is not a declaration of war but contemplates only the specific
redress of a specific indignity.
Admiral Fletcher has taken possession of custom-house at Vera
Cruz. No resistance at time, but later battery and scattered
forces fired on Americans, which was returned. Four Americans
killed, twenty wounded. Loss on Mexican side not known; estiInated 150. (1914, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 483.)

Argentine, Brazil, and Chile offered good offices, which
were accepted, and the mediators 'vere to asse1nble at
Niagara Falls, May 18. So far as possible it was hoped
that the stattbS quo would not be changed. After much
negotiation, on November 20, 1914, the Acting Secretary
--of War telegraphed to General Funston, of the occupying forces at Vera Cruz :
You will evacuate Vera Cruz on 1\Ionday, Noven1ber 23d. You
will bring with you to the United States all funds. in your possession frmn whatever source derived, both United States funds
and Mexican customs, receipts and taxes. You will also bring
with you all the records, accounts, and money papers necessary
to establish the integrity and accuracy of your financial and other
administration. You will make an inventory of all goods in the
customs house keeping the original thereof and leaving a copy
with Consul Canada. You may also leave with Consul Canada
such copies of accounts or other data as may be required by
·whmnsoever 1nay continue the govern1nent of the city. Do not
make any arrangements with local :Mexicans or with l\Iexican
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representatiYes from outside the city that could make it seem,,
that you are recognizing the right of Carranza to jurisdiction over
the city. It is merely desired that you get out in the best practical fashion, leaving things in as good shape as possible and
making no declaration that could be interpreted as committing ·
this Govenunent to the recognition of the authority of any individual or faction. (Ibid., p. 625.)

Dominican Republic, 1916.-0n January 19, 1916, the
American l\1inister to the Do1ninican Republic telegraphed to the Secretary of State saying: " I think the
Departn1ent should be prepared for probable difficulty in
the country soon." On account of this and other infor--·
1nation, the Secretary of State informed the Minister
that if requested the American Govern1nent 'vould " furnish the forces necessary to suppress insurrection and·
1naintain order." (1916, Foreign Relations, U.S., -p.
220.) The difficulty i1nplied in the Minister's telegran1,
though a little delayed, arose, and 'var vessels were dis-patched to Santo Domingo and other ports. In May
1916 forces under Admiral W. B. Caperton took control
of the city of Santo Domingo and else,vhere in order to
take such action " as is necessary to protect United States
forces ashore, preserve peace, lives, protection and property of . .A. 1nerican citizens and other foreigners and to
constituted authority." (Ibid., p. 230.)
Capt. H. S. Knapp, U.S.N., commander of the cruiser
force, United States Atlantic Fleet, und~r authority of
his GoYerninent, on November 29, 1916, declared the
Dominican Republic to be in the state of 1nilitary occupation by forces of the United States. This proclamation
declared the occupation to be undertaken to restore in. ternal order and to enable the Republic .to fulfill its
international obligations.
The United States Government also took over military
control in certain parts of Haiti in 1915 and 1916 in order-·
" to safeguard as far as possible the interests of all con-cerned "~ as insurrectionary 1novements had prevailed for·
some n1onths.
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Russia, 1917.-A somewhat exceptional situation arose
in con~quence of the revolution in Russia in 1917. This
led some of the Allied Powers to put what amounted to
an embargo upon shipments to Russia, though in some
cases the embargo extended to munitions only. The
United States took the position that it was "important
that the impression should not be created in the minds of
the Russian people that they have been abandoned by
the Allies or the United States Government, and for
that reason this Government has told the Russian repre.sentati ves that all shipments of supplies being manufactured in this cpuntry other than munitions 'vill be permitted to go forward. The question can1e up as to
whether railway supplies were munitions and Department told Russiap A1nbassador that licenses would be
granted for shipment of engines and rails." (1918, For.
Rei. U.S., 3 Rus8ia, p. 107.)
D~pu~e bet~een Italy and Greece, 1923.-In discussing whether articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant
could be. applied to the occupation of Corfu, M. Salandra,
the Italian representative, read a note from his Government on thi~ question :
What is the Greek contention? It is that the occupation o!
Corfu was a hostile act which may lead to a rupture dangerous
,_for the'}Jeace --'of the world. Italy, however, has solemnly declared tb:at this occupation had no hostile character-that it was
merely -designed to assure obligations arising out of responsibility for a terrible crime. There is no danger of war. There is
not even a suspension of diplomatic relations. • * •
The creation of the League of Nations does not constitute a
renunciation of States of all right to act for the defence and
safety of their rights and their dignity. If this were so, no State
would desire to belong to the League. (League of Nations,
Offl~al Journal, July-December, 1923, p. 1288.)

· After the settlement of the dispute, M. Salandra asked
permission to present certain observations.
-of "'peaceful occupation", he said:

In speaking

It must not be t11ought that the CoYenant of the League of
Nations forbids these peaceful menns of repression~ They are
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not forbidden by any of its articles. I may add that in its Preamble the principles of international law are expressly recognised. Among these principles is the right of peaceful reprisals
an<l. of occupation as a measure of guarantee. .These reprisals
are therefore legitimate. (Ibid., p. 1314.)

In a later discussion on the interpretation of certain
articles o£ the Covenant, Lord Robert Cecil commented
on M. Salandra's point of view, and said:
In the last speech that he ma(~e on the Itnlo-Greek question,
he (:M. Salandra) undoubtedly took up the question of the legitimacy of reprisals in general, not only with respect to the occupation of territory but as to a great number of other reprisals ;
be argued with great force-and I am not at all prepared to say
that I <lisagree with him-that, until the adoption of the Covenant at any rate, there was a right of reprisal or coercion--call
it what you will-which one country might undertake
order
tc enforce demands on another.
In my young days, when I was more familiar with the textbooks of international law than I am now, I thfnk such actions
used to be called measures short of war.
Mr. Salandra also argued that the Covenant had made HO
difference to those rights. That is an interesting argument, and,
though it would be hypocrisy to say that the question had not
become acute owing to recent events, yet it is a question of very
great interest and importance for the public law of Europe at
this moment. A great number of instances have actually oc<'Urred, and others have been threatened, of measures of coercion
being applied by one State against another. I think it is of great
importance for the Council of the League to be informed exactly
how far these are legal nowadays under the Covenant, because
evidently the Council may have to deal with such situations at
any moment. . (Ibid., p. 1321.)

in

Lord Robert Cecil suggested that this be· put in the
form o£ a proposal and submitted to the Permanent
Court o£ International Justice. He proposed:
The existence and nature of the right of one State to enforce
demands made upon another State by measures · of coercion and
reprisal, and bow far, if at all, the Covenant has modified any
such rights as between Members of the League.

It 'vas finally decided to put certain questions before a
Co1nmi ttee of Jurists.
·
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Questions before League of Nations, 19~3.-Certain
questions in regard to the use of force arose in 1923 early
in the existence of the League of Nations. These questions were referred to a Committee of Jurists consisting
of M. Adatci (Japan), Lord Buckmaster (Great Britain), Dr. Enrique Buero (Uruguay), l\1. F. de Castello
Branco Clark (Brazil), M. Fromageot (France), Dr.
van Hamel (director of the legal section of the Secretariat), M. Vittorio Rolandi Ricci (Italy), M. Oesten
Unden (Sweden), Marquis de Villa Urrutia (Spain),
and M. de Visscher (Belgium). One of these questions
'vas:
QUEST'ION

4.

.Are measures of coercion which are not meant to constitute
acts of war consistent with the tenns of Article 12 to 15 of the
Covenant when they are taken by one Member of the League of
Nations against another lVIember of the League without prior recourse to the procedure laid down in those article's? (League of
Nations, A. 8. 1924, p. 9. Report to Fifth Asse1nbly.)

To this question the reply "\vas not conclusive but was
supported in the vote approving the replies as a 'vhole.
The following was the reply to the fourth question:
Coercive measures 'vhich are not intended to constitute acts of
war may or may not be consistent with the provision·s of Articles
12 to 15 of the Covenant, and it is for the Council, when the dispute has been submitted to it, to decide immediately, having due
regard to all the circumstances of the case and to the nature
of the measures adopted, whether it ·should recommend the xnaintenance or the withdrawal of such 1neasures. (Ibid., p. 10.)

1'reaty of Versailles, J,9J!J.-Some late treaties have
contemplated the possibilities of reprisals and other
1neasures. Even the Treaty of Versailles, which contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, contains
some such clauses. In the part of that treaty relating
to reparations, it is said:
17. In case of default by Gennany in the performance of any
Gbligation under this Part of the present Treaty, the Comtnission
will forthwith ~in~ notif'c of ~uch (lt\fault to eaeh of the inter-
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estell Powers and may make such recommendations as to the
action to be taken in consequence of such default as it may
think necessary.
18. The measu1·es which the Allied and Associated Powers
shall llUYe the right to take, in case of voluntary default b~·
Gennan~·, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of
wnr, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective
Govenunents may determine to be necessary in the circumstances.
(Part VIII, annex II, 17, 18.)

Force has been used in th~ occupation o:f certain areas
of Germany.
League of Nation8 Covenant, 1920.-The Covenant of
the League of Nations beca1ne operative by the ratification o:f the 'rreaty o:f Versailles, January 10, 1920. The
prea1nble of the Covenant states that:
THE HIGH CONTRAOTING PARTIES.

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve

iBternationttl peace and security
by the acce})tance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international
law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all
treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one
another, Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations. (1919,
Naval " .. ar College, Int. Law Documents, p. 8.)

League of Nations and war.-The Covenant o:f the
League of Nations in article 16 states:
1. Should any Men1ber of the League resort to war in disregard of its coYenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso
facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all
other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals
and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, com1nercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the
nationals of any other State, whether a Me1nber of the League of
not.
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2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recomnlend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Metnbers of the League shall severally
contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants
of the League.
3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they 'vill
1nutually support one another in the financial and economic
measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize
the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and
that they will n1utually support one another in resisting any
special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenantbreaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to
afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the
Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the
covenants of the League.
4. Any Me1nber of the League which has violated any covenant
of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the
League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other l\1embers of the League represented
thereon.

·By this article 16 a state of 'var is contetnplated in
'vhich the forces of 1nembers of the League are to be used,
and by article 17 a nonmember may take advantage of
League procedure, or in ca@e the nonmember refuses
article 16 ~may become operative, or, if both parties refuse, the Council of the League "may take such measures
and make such recom1nendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute."
In article 11 it had been declared that " any war or
threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the
Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to
safeguard the peace of nations."
League of Nations and measwres short of war.-Article
10 and articles 12, 13, and 15 contemplate measures short
of war but which may lead to war if League procedure
is disregarded. Article 10 contains a positive obligation:
The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case
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of any such aggression or in case of any threat of danger of
such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which
this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Articles 12, 13, and 15 provide for procedure in case
of "any dispute likely to lead to rupture " prior to "resort to war." The preservation of members of the
League against aggression as contemplated in article 10might involve such 1neasures short of war as the Council
may advise.
Relations of third states.-Specific measures involvingthe use of force without declaring war have been varied
and have often been resorted to in order to avoid war~
The use of force by one state against another may inconvenience third states without involving any of the relations arising from the status of neutrality.
Undoubtedly the Covenant of the League of Nations
binds the members of the League to take such action asthe League may deem wise " to safeguard the peace of'
nations." It may be difficult in a certain case to determine the extent and exact nature of this obligation. It
may be and has been contended that self-protection justifies such acts as may be essential to the preservation of·
a state's existence and until the League is in position to
exercise " the enforcement by common action of international obligations ", a state must take necessary measures
for its immediate security without waiting the slow processes of the League. States in becoming members ofthe League of Nations did not agree to give up their
legitimate rights of self-defense but conceived that they
would be more secure. The Covenant of the League of
Nations recognizes the possibility of resort to war after
a delay of 3 months when an award has been rendered
by the arbitrators or a report by the Council.. There
remain many questions in regard to the relations of third
states when the acts of two states seem to be leading to
measures which are not strictly pacific.
United States Navy Regulations.-The right of selfpreservation is generally recognized both in time of peace·
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and in tin1e of 'var. In ti1ne of war acts which 'vould
not be regarded as la,vful in time of peace are tolerated.
Interference with neutral trade in certain articles as in
case of contraband, with movement of ships to specified
__ports as in case of blockade, and other restrictions upon
neutral action are generally admitted to be la,vful.
rThese are derived from the right of the belligerent to
protect itself and to weaken its opponent.
Even in tin1e of peace it ma.y be essential to use force.
''fhe Navy Regulations of the United States state:
1646. On occasions where injury to the United States or to
citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the
:principles of international law or treaty rights, the conunander in
chief shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul
of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the
·ca·se de?lands, reporting iminediately to the Secretary of the
Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a
.naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer
·thereof.
1647. The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or
.against anyone within the territoi'ies thereof, is illegal. The
right of self-preservation, ho,vever, is a right 'vhich belongs to
.States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, ancl its possessions,
and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may
suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation can not be defined beforehand,
but must be left to tlH~ sound judgn1ent of responsible officers, who
are to perfonn their duties in this respect with all possible care
. and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in tin1e of
peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preser·vation as above defined. It must be used o~ly as a last resort,
and then only to the extent which is ~bsolutely necessary to ac, complish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view
to inflicting punishment for acts already committed.
1648. Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned
·'Principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force in
foreign territor~ on occasions of political disturbance 'vhere the
local authorities are unable to give adequate protection to life
-and property, the assent of such authorities, or of son1e one of
.them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice
~t o the interest involved.
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Locarno treaties, J9t25.-The treaties relating to peace
in Europe of October 16, 1925, con11nonly called the
treaties of Locarno, ain1ed to give "supplementary guarantees 'vithin the fraine,vork of the Covenant of the
J..Jeague of Nations, and the treaties in force between
them."
In the treaty of Inntual guaranty bet,Yeen Gerinany,
Belgiun1, France, Great Britain, and Italy, these states
by article 1 :
<:ollectively arHl seYerally guarantee, in the mmnwr JH'OYided in
the following Articles, the n1aintenance of the territorial status
quo resulting fron1 the frontiers between Gennany and Belgium
and between Germany and ]france, and the inviolability of the
sn i<l frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace
signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of
the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty concerning the <lemilitarised zone. (54 League of Nations, Treaty Series,
p. 280.)

ln article 2 :
Gennany and Belgium, and also Gern1any and France, mutually
undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other
or resort to war against each otlwr.

'fhis stipulation shall not, ho,Yever, apply in case of:
( 1) The exercise of the right of legitin1a te defence, that is to
Hay, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the
previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of Articles 42 and 43
of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an
unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assen1bly of
armed forces in the demilitarised zone, hn1nediate action is
necessary ;
(2) Action in pursuance of article 16 of the CoYenant of the
League of Nations;
( 3) Action as the result of a dedsion taken by the Asse1nbly
or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of
article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed
against a State which was the first to attack. (Ibid., p. 293.)

Pact of Paris, 1928.-The Pact of Paris, August 27,
1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact), has been generally ratified
3628-34--9
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by the states of the "·orld, and its essential articles are
as follows:
ART. 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the
names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to
war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce
it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another.
ART. 2. The high contracting parties agree that the settlement
or solution of all disputes or conflict~ of "·ha tever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise an1ong them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means.

Article I enunciates a condemnation and renunciation
of international war.
Article II, which is in for1n of an agreement, provides that settlement or solution of disputes among the
parties "shall never be sought except by pacific means.'~
No procedure for putting this article into operation
was provided. No provision was made for its termination or revision. Some states have therefore regarded
the pact as another step toward assuring the continuation of the status quo except as it 1nay be n1odified by
friendly negotiation.
There remains, however, a great difference of opinion
as to what are "pacific means." There are those who
argue that the pact is much weaker than article 10 and
the :following articles of the Covenant of the League of
Nations.
The Senate of the United States in ratifying the Pact
of Paris recorded in the .report of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations its understanding of the effect of
the treaty.
The COinmittee rer)Orts the above treaty with the understanding
that the right of self-defense is in no way curtailed or in1paired
by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free
at all times and regardless of the treaty provisions to defend
itself, and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of selfdefense and the necessity and extent of the same.
The Unit~d States regards the l\fonroe doctrine as a part of
its national security and defense. (70 Con. Rec., Jan. 15, 1929,
p. 1730.)
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0 ollective action.-The proposals for collective action
for the maintenance of peace or for the carrying out of
an agreed policy has been common among states. The
doctrine of balance of power and the concert of powers
in Europe modified the course of action of European
powers and the distribution of the spoils of war. Alliances usually ostensibly for the maintenance of peace
often sought the establishment of the status quo. Alliances and ententes frequently equalized opposing groups
to a degree which made the risk of disturbing the peace
greater than any party cared to assume.
Some of the resultant co1nbinations have put forth.
doctrines of broad scope, while others have proposed.
regional policies. The division on the basis of " Great
Powers " and " Minor Powers " has been fundamental in.
some of the acts of European states. The contentions:
which let! to a more general recognition of the idea of'
equality of states made some new basis of collective ac-tion essential. This was realized at the close of the
World War in 1918 and the Covenant of the. League of
Nations in part embodied the then existing aspirations
for collective action by the states of the 'vorld.
Early United States action.-The Articles of Confederation of the United States, 1778, provided for common
action as in article III :
The said states hereby severally enter into n firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defencel the security
of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding
themselves to assist each othee, against Rll force offered to, or
attacks made upon them or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.

Article XIII provided further :for observance of the
articles.
Every state shall abide by the determinations of the united
states in congress assembled, on all que~tions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this
confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and tbe
union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made· in any of them; unless such alteration be
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agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards
confirmed by the legislatures of every state.

Realizing that the lack of specified means fot carrying
vut the provisions of article XIII might give rise to
difficulties, the matter was considered and a form of
action somewhat similar to that proposed in the League
of Nations' Covenant was set forth for application in
case of a state that had failed to observe article XIII:
the said United States in Congress assembled are fully authorized to employ the force of the United States as well by sea as
by land to compel such State or States to fulfill their federal
engagements, and particularly to make distraint on any of the
effects vessels and merchandizes of such State or States or of
any of the Citizens thereof wherever found and to prohibit and
prevent their trade and intercourse as well with any other of the
United States and the Citizens thereof, as with any foreign State,
and as well by land as by sea until full compensation or compliance be obtained with respect to all requisitions made by the
United States in Congress assembled in pursuance of the Articles
of Confederation. (20 Jour. Cont. Cong., Hunt ed., p. 470.)

Constitutional provi8ions of the United St(J)tes.-Article
1 of the Constitution of the United States, section 8,
states that Congress shall have power to provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States
and " to regulate commerce 'vith foreign nations."
Under the constitutional powers an act of Congress,
June 13, 1798 ( 1 U. S. Stat. 565), suspended commercial
intercourse bet,veen the United States and France.
British-Swedish concert, 1813-1.4.-By the treaty of
March 3, 1813, Great Britain agreed to cooperate with
Sweden " for the maintenance of the independence of
the North " and in article II, it was stated:

.

tbat His Britannic Majesty will not only not oppose any obstacle
to the annexation and union in perpetuity of the l{ingdom of
Norway as an integral part to the Kingdom of Sweden, but also
will assist the views of His lVIajesty the King of Sweden to that
effect, either by his good offices, or by employing, if it should be
necessary, his naval co-operation in concert with the Swedish or
Hussian forces. (1 British and Foreign State Papers, p. 298.)

~
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The Swedish-Russian treaties of April 5 and June 15,
also promised Russia both diplomatic and milita.r y aid.
Prussia also agrees to aid Sweden by a separate and
secret article, April 22, 1813.
The British blockade of the ports of Norway \Yas
notified on April 29, 1814. The Foreign Office announceInent w·as as follo\vs:
Earl Bathurst, one of His 1\Iajesty's Principal Secretaries of
State, has this day notified, by command of His Royal Highness
the Prince Regent, to the l\Iinisters of Friendly Powers resident
at this court, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, that
the necessary 1neasures ba ve been taken by coinmand of His
Royal Highness, for the Blockade of the Ports of Norway, and
that from this time 'all the measures authorized by the Law of
Nations will be a_dopted and executed with respect to all Vessels
which may attempt to violate the said Blockade. (Ibid., p. 1277.)

This blockade was raised under the following notice
issued September 3, 1814:
Earl Bathurst, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of
State, bas this day notified, by command of His Royal Highness
the Prince Regent, to the Ministers of Friendly Powers resident
at this Court that the necessary orders will forthwith be issued
to the Officer commanding His Majesty's Ships and Vessels employed in the Blockade of the Coast of Norway, to discontinue
the said Blockade. (Ibid., p. 1277.)

United action.-While the United States has generally
refrained from agreeing in advance to act together with
the military forces of other powers, yet it has at times
expressed willingness to cooperate. Prince Bis1narck in
1870 raised question as to " whether it would not be for
the common interest of the powers engaged in the China
trade to inaugurate a plan of combined action, to be
settled by previous arrangement between the various governments, or between the commanders of the several
squadrons." (1870, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 330.)
The· British Government gave orders for cooperation of
its naval forces in combined measures and later Secretary Fish replied to the Minister of the North German
Union as follows:
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Washington, !Jfarch 31, 1870.

SIR : Referring to your notes of the 19th and 25th of February
last, and ()f the 28th of March current, concerning a proposed
combined action of the naval forces of the United s·tates and of
North Germany for the suppression of piracy in the Chinese
waters, I have now the honor to inform you that the President
11as taken great pleasure in complying with the request of Count
Bis1narck, by dire<!ting instructions to be issued from the Navy
Departlnent to Achniral Rogers, to cooperate for that purpose
with .. the naval forces of the North Germany and such other
powers as shall receive similar instructions.
The cooperation of Adiniral Rogers and of the forces under
his coininand will, however, be limited to cases of recognized
piracy. He will be instructed to proceed in such a way as not
to wound the sensibilities of the Chinese government, or to
interfere with the lawful commerce of the Chinese subjects, or to
conflict Yvith the peaceful policy toward China in which the government of North Gern1any and the United States so happily
agree.
I a vail 1nyself of this opportunity to renew the assurances
of 1ny distinguished consideration.
HAMILTON FISH.

(Ibid., p. 331.)

0 oope1·at/on on slave trade.-The United States has
from time to time agreed to cooperate 'vith other states
in the use of force. The suppression of the slave trade
'vas a ground for such action as provided in the treaty
of 1842 with Great Britain:
ARTICLE VIII. The parties 1nutually ·stipulate that each shall
prepare, equip, and 1naintain in service on the coast of Africa a
sufficient and adequate squadron or naval force of vessels of suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry in all not less than eighty
guns, to enforce separately and r·espectively, the laws, rights, and
obligations of each of the two countries for the suppre·s sion of
the slave-trade, the said squadrons to be independent of each
other, but the two Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give
such orders to the officers commanding their respective forces as
shall enable t1Ien1 1nost effectively to act in concert and cooperation, :upon mutual consultation, as ~xigencies may arise, for the
attainment of the tru~ object of t~1is article, copies of all such
orders to be cominunicated by each Government to the other,
respective])·. ( 8 U.S. Stat., p. 572.)
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Detailed provisions for rendering this cooperation
tnore effective were embodied in the treaty of 1862. A
restricted right of search and detention in specified areas
\Vas reciprocally allowed and 1nixed courts for adjudication \Vere established. The convention of 1870 provided
for the discontinuance of the courts.
1"'he general act signed at Brussels, July 2, 1890, by
17 states unified to a considerable extent the pre vious conventions relating to the slave trade and at the
-same time increased the nun1ber of states authorized to
act as regards one another for the suppression of the
traffic. A sort of clearing house was to be set up as an
international office at Zanzibar. By this convention the
scope of right of com1non action of the signatory states
was much enlarged.
0 olombia, 1885.-ln 1884--85 there w-as an " unsettled
state of affairs " in Colombia and owing to the " disordered condition of society" and the anticipated " disregard of the rights of foreigners on the coast and
Isthmus," the American n1inister requested the presence
of an "American man-of-war." Early in 1885 communication with the American minister \vas cut off by the disturbed conditions and the naval officer at Pan:una \vas
obliged to act \vithout con1n1unication vYith the cliploInatic representative at Bogota. During the period of
"disordered conditions", the forces of the United States
took positive measures to protect the rights of An1erican
citizens.
Bo.r;er uprising in China, 1900.-During the Boxer
uprising in China in 1900 the United States 1naintained
so far as possible a policy of independent action, though
cooperating ''ith the other Po\vers \Vhen it seen1ed essential. Regarding the sending by Mr. Conger, United
States Minister to China, of an identic note to the
Chinese Foreign Office, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State,
'vrote on March 22 :
Iu c'Onnection 'Yith the identic note agreed upon with your
.colleagues of France, Germany, and Great Britain, and sent by you
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to the yamen on January 21 (inclosure 3, dispatch No. 316),.
'vhile the Department finds no objection to the general terms of
this paper [demanding publication of strong imperial decree
without delay], it would have preferred if you had made separaterepresentation on the question instead of the n1ode adopted, as.
the position of the United States in relation to China .makes it
expedient, that, while circu1nstances may sometimes require that
it act on lines similar to those other tt·eaty powers follow, it
should do :-:;o singly and without the cooperation of other powers ..
(1900, Foreign Relations, U.S., p. 111.)

On June 7, however, Mr. Conger co1n1nunicated with
Mr. Hay w·ith regard to whether he should join the diplo-Inatic corps if this body found it " necessary to demand
special audience 'vith En1peror ", Mr. Hay replied:
Act independently in protection of American interests where·
practicable, and concurrently with representatives of other powers
if necessity arise. (Ibid., p. 142--43.)

Mr. Conger on June 8 again suggested that he join the·
diplomatic corps in den1.anding "an audience with
Emperor, the demand to be insisted upon, and to state·
to the Throne that unless Boxer war is immediately suppressed and order restored foreign powers will be compelled themselves to take 1neasures to that end." To this
suggestion Mr. Hay's reply was "Yes", but in a suppleinentary 1nessage the following day he added,
'Ye have no policy in China exC'ept to protect with energy
A1nerican interests, and especially An1erican citizens and the legation. There n1ust be nothing done which would conuuit us to
future action inconsistent with your standing instructione. There·
1nust be no alliances. (Ibid.)

On July 3, in order to place before the world the position
of the United States in regard to the restoration of orderin China, Mr. Hay sent the following circular telegram
to United States representatives in the legations of the·
principal powers with the instructions that the purport
of this statement be comn1unicated to the 1ninister forforeign affairs. This telegram read:
In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as present
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eircumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy
initiated by us in 1857, of peace with the Chinese nation, of
furtherance of lawful comtnerce, and of protection of lives and
property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extraterritorial rights and by the law of nations. * * * The purpose
of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently
with the other powers, first, in opening up communication with
Pekin and rescuing An1erican officials, missionaries, and other
Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible
protection everywhere in China to American life and property;
thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legithuate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders
to the other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such
·disasters. * * * (Ibid., p. 299.)

On the same day; Mr. Hay communicated to the French
Charge d'Affaires in Washington that" instructions have
been telegraphed to the commander of the United States
naval :forces in Chi'nese \Vaters to confer \vith his colleagues and report as to the :force necessary to accomplish
the ends now purposed and the proportionate :force to
be appropriately employed by the United States :for their
attainment in the general interest of the powers concerned." This was in response to the request of the
French Government that there be a " concert of the
po\vers, with a view to sending identical instructions to
the commanding officers of their respective :forces in the
Pechili. * * * " (Ibid., pp. 318-319.)
Later in the same month the French Government,
through the Charge in_Washington, suggested in a mem·o randum to the United States that "the Government o:f
the Republic is disposed to confer with the powers in
the precautions to be taken to prevent the shipment o:f
arms which should be destined :for China." A memorandum o:f the same date, July 20, 1900, issued by the
Department o:f State indicates that the Secretary o:f
State had given orders to the officers in the various departments concerned " to exercise the utinost vigilance
to prevent the dispatch or the landing in China of any
arms destined for improper use in that country. and had
given direct orders to the consuls of the United States
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in China to do all in their power in the same direction."
(Ibid., p. 319.)
In August conditions in China being in no \vay iinproved, it was suggested to the United States through
its Embassy, that the Gern1an Government \Vould like
to know the vie,vs of the United States Government in
regard to placing the An1erican forces under the chief
com1nand of Field Marshal Count V\T aldersee in Chihli,
and it was stated that Japan and Russia had already
agreed to such an arra.nge1nent. The n1e1norandum of
the Department of State on this matter was transmitted
to the German Foreign Office on August 10. It read:
The Government of the United States will be 1nuch gratified
to secure the cmnmand of so distinguished and experienced an
officer as Count '\Valdersee for any combined military operations
in which the American troops take part after the arrival of that
officer in China to attain the purposes declared by this Government in the circular note delivered to the powers under date of
.J uly 3.
The general cmnmanding the A1nerican forces in China has
already been authorized to agree with other con1manders as to
a con1mon official direction of the various forces in their combined operations, preserving the integrity of his American division
as a separate organization. A copy of this communication will be
transmitted to him.
As a considerable tin1e must elapse before Count '\Valdersee·
can reach China and conditions are rapidly changing, it would
seem desirable to lea Ye questions of method to be determined in
Yie\v of the conditions which 1nay then exist. The suggestion
of His l\1ajest~· the Gern1an Emperor that one or n1ore military
officers of each nationality should be attached to the headquarters
of Count "\Valdersee to maintain communications with the national
contingent meets the approval of this Government. (Ibid.,.
p. 331.)

Swedish p1"oposition, 1916.-In 1916 the s,vedish Minister in London made lmo,vn in a 1nen1orandum to
Colonel House the Swedish desire forAn effective collaboration with other neutral powers in view
of conYentional a-nd idealistic interests. The GoYernn1ei1t, who
are sincerely pacific, have been compelled to recognize that the
difficulties must increase with the extension of the· fight, and
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that the possibilities for neutral interests to assert themselves
evidently decrease il) the sam~ proportion as the circle of neutrals
becomes narrowed clown through the entry in the struggle of new
powers.
The Government are convinced that it would prove a great
and irreparable damage if the voice of neutrals could not make
itself heard with sufficient weight. With regard to this, the
Government do not only think of the difficulties and losses inflicted upon one or the other of neutral countries through undue
i11terference from the belligerents, inconveniences which might
have been avoided through a unanimous action of the interested
neutral states.
The Swedish Government consider it as the precious duty and
the inalienable right of all sincerely neutral countries to intervene with impartiality and firmness against every atten1pt,
whenceever they come, to render non-valid and void international
rules, which are the fruit of centuries of experience and work.
By preserving the inheritance of the law of nations, a service is
indeed also rendered to the belligerents themselves, who under
altered circumstances may one day have bitterly to regret-also
from practical point of view-the actions in which they now
allow themselves to indulge in order to gain a casual and often
doubtful advantage. (1916, Foreign Relations, U. S. Supplement
part II, p. 689.)

s,veden had in 1914 joined with Denmark and Norway
in an identic note (1914 Id., supple1nent, p. 360), with
which the Netherlands agreed, addressed to the German,
French, British, and Russian ministers and protesting
against the infringement of the rights of neutrals, and
upholding the inviolability of the funda1nental rules of
international law.
A later communication in a circular telegram to the
American diplomatic officers in Europe stated that it 'vas
considered inadvisable by the Americ.an Govern1nent to
participate in a conference of neutrals. The geographical remoteness, the failure to include other American
republics in the invitation, and the policy of independent
action, were given as reasons for the decision.
Defence and, restraint.-ln some forn1 physical restraint upon the action of man against 1nan has been
con1mon from earliest times. The delegation to special
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persons of the exercise of this restraint upon the action
of one 1nan or a group of men against another man or
group of men has gradually grown up as men have united
in larger and more unified groups. While at certain
stages of civilization, the group itself might 1nobilize for
defense as in early Americ.a.n settlements, at other stages
as in modern European states special classes are trained
to defend the group with highly technical means. It
seemed but a natural development fro1n national to international defense or restraint. International guaranties
of security 'vere proposed and sometimes embodied in
agreements or treaties. The experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth century has not confirmed the
one ti1ne belief in the efficacy of such methods.
As states assumed the protection of those subject to
their authority, various measures were resorted to to
assure the respect for this protection and for the rights
claimed for their subjects. Reprisals in some for1n were
approved a1nong early states and quite fully developed
in Roman practice and during the Middle Ages. Letters
of marque and reprisal and pri vateering gave evidence of
the survival of early methods. Sequestration of public
or private property of an offending state or of its ·- nationals, breaking off of official or other relations, expulsion
or arrest of nationals, occupation of ports or territory of
the offending state, or other measures might be taken in
time of strained relations between states. Embargo and
nonintercourse acts did put a degree of restraint upon
offenders but not always to the anticipated degree.
Pacific blockade, retorsion, and other measures short of
'var 'vere fron1 tilne to ti1ne tried with varying degree of
success. The belief became more and more general in
the twentieth century, particularly after the Hague Conference of 1899, that concerted action and international
agreements would assure an orderly world.
Severally and jointly.-When a group has agreed severally and jointly not 1nerely is the group under obliga-
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tion to act to secure the end for which the agreement
is made, but each member is under an independent obligation to act. There is no.t the same obligation to act,
ho·wever, when a state ·simply declares its intention to
act in a certain manner or to follow a named policy, for
its policy may from time to time change as probably
was the case when it made the declaration. A declaration, being unilateral, .rests upon the state making the
declaration, and the use of its forces will depend upon
the conditions under which the declaration is made. An
agreement, however, has a binding :force 'vhich implies
that other powers as well as the parties to the agreement
may expect the terms of the agreement to be fulfilled,
though, of course, the agreement does not make unlawful
action lawful. Even if many states make identic declarations, this fact does not prevent one of the states from
renouncing the position taken in the declaration.
As states A, B, and C have severally and jointly agreed
to the boycott of X and Y, the action of one in the boycott is the action of all. The action of each should therefore be that which would most effectively realize the
ends for which the boycott 'vas undertaken. The ports
of each should be open, so far as the conduct of the boycott is concerned, on the sa1ne terms to vessels of all and
the conduct of port authorities and other officials should
as regards the boycott be similar.
)SOLUTION

III

(a) I'he A jaw should determine for what port the
Banner is bound, and if for a port of X or if uncertain,
should send the Banner to the nearest port of A , B, or C.
If the B mnner had sailed before the boycott was protlaimed, the Banner should be notified of the boycott and
should be prohibited from entering any port of X.
The Brook should act in the same manner unless for
special reasons the Banner should be· sent to a port of B.
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(b) The Crown should take such action as 'vould make
certain that the merchant vessel of X goes to a port of
B or some port of A or C.
( o) The Crown, if assured of the nationality of the
Drone," may take no action though the Drone may be kept
from entering ports of X which are effectively closed.
(d) Merchant· vessels of X or D, E, and F bound out
:from X under convoy of vessel of war of X are. free to
proceed but when bound for X the cruisers of states A,
B and C may take action to prevent entrance of the
vessels· to ports which are effectively closed and may
l'oute or take vessels of X bound for X to ports of A,
B, and C..
·

